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Understanding the factors which affect the age of acquisition (AoA) of words and
concepts is fundamental to understanding cognitive development more broadly.
Traditionally, studies of AoA have taken two approaches, either exploring the effect of
linguistic variables such as input frequency (e.g., Naigles and Hoff-Ginsberg, 1998) or
the semantics of the underlying concept, such as concreteness or imageability (e.g.,
Bird et al., 2001). Embodied theories of cognition, meanwhile, assume that concepts,
even relatively abstract ones, can be grounded in the embodied experience. While the
focus of such discussions has been mainly on grounding in external modalities, more
recently some have argued for the importance of interoceptive features, or grounding in
complex modalities such as social interaction. In this paper, we argue for the integration
and extension of these two strands of research.We demonstrate that the psycholinguistic
factors traditionally considered to determine AoA are far from sufficient to account for
the variability observed in AoA data. Given this gap, we propose groundability as a
new conceptual tool that can measure the degree to which concepts are grounded
both in external and, critically, internal modalities. We then present a mechanistic
theory of conceptual representation that can account for groundability in addition to the
existing variables argued to influence concept acquisition in both the developmental and
embodied cognition literatures, and discuss its implications for future work in concept
and cognitive development.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Within representationalist theories of embodied cognition, the symbol grounding problem has
traditionally received much attention. The reason for the focus can be understood from a historical
perspective: as Chemero (2009) notes, these theories developed primarily as a reaction to purely
computationalist views of cognition1. One of the main criticisms leveled at such views was that they
assume amodal symbols which aremeaningless to the system itself—whatevermeaning the symbols
might carry was attributed by external observers. How such symbols could acquire meaning that
is intrinsic to the system became known as the symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990), and
the central claim to the solution in embodied terms is that the meaning is acquired through
sensorimotor interaction with the world.
1In contrast, non-representationalist theories of embodied cognition are an evolution of Ecological Psychology and its
precursors.
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This has led to at least two major research strands. On the
more experimental end of the spectrum, much work has focused
on detailing the involvement of sensorimotor areas of the brain
in, for instance, language processing (see Chersi et al., 2010, for a
review). Although such involvement is often taken as evidence
for a grounded or embodied understanding of concepts, it is
worth pointing out that this is not uncontroversial: Mahon and
Caramazza (2008), for instance argue, that the evidence is not
sufficient to invalidate disembodied hypotheses.
On the computational end of the spectrum, researchers are
interested in creating models of symbol grounding. Eliasmith
(2013), for example, details a “semantic pointer architecture,”
which provides a computational implementation of many aspects
of Barsalou’s perceptual symbol system (Barsalou, 1999). Other
efforts consider robotic implementations of such models (see for
instance, Stramandinoli et al., 2012, or for a review, Coradeschi
et al. 2013).
A particularly interesting aspect of research across the entire
spectrum concerns the putative grounding of abstract concepts—
that is, concepts which do not have a directly perceivable
sensorimotor target (see, for instance Dove, 2011; Thill et al.,
2014, for recent reviews and discussions). While it is relatively
straightforward to propose accounts of sensorimotor grounding
of concrete concepts—which do have an observable sensorimotor
target in the external world—it is less clear how, if at all, abstract
concepts should relate to embodied experience. Mahon and
Caramazza (2008) give the example of the concept “beautiful,”
for which they claim that there is no corresponding consistent
sensory or motor information (their emphasis).
An early attempt at explanation is given by the conceptual
metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), which postulates
that metaphors and analogical reasoning (e.g., an argument is
like war; happiness is up) mediate grounding of abstract concepts
in direct sensorimotor experience. However, Dove (2011) points
out that the required cognitive mechanisms, such the ability
to construct such analogies and metaphors, are not likely to
develop until relatively late. He further argues that linguistic
representations are dis-embodied (the specific term he coined,
and distinct from disembodied) in the sense that they do not
acquire semantic content from embodiment, even though they
may remain dynamic, multimodal and grounded in linguistic
experience. Zwaan (2015) also argues that abstract concepts
“acquire a specific sensorimotor instantiation in a discourse
context” while being only weakly associated with sensorimotor
representations. Similarly, Barsalou et al. (2008) previously
proposed the Language And Situated Simulation (LASS) theory,
arguing that both linguistic forms and situated simulations are
used to represent concepts, including abstract ones.
Other theories imply that the grounding of more abstract
concepts can take place in modalities beyond the five senses
in the strict sense. The Words As Tools theory (WAT; Borghi
and Binkofski, 2014) sees words as social tools, whose use is a
“type of experience” (Borghi and Cimatti, 2012, p. 22), which
provides a potential way of grounding abstract concepts in a
type of social modality. Similarly, Thill et al. (2014) argue that
one should not restrict the embodied experience to the “outside”
in a theory of concept grounding while Wellsby and Pexman
(2014a) note that the focus so far has been more on interaction
with the external world and less on “sensing bodies” (their
term). This is also true for theories that try to link abstract
concepts to embodiment, for instance by grounding them in the
sensorimotor representations activated across different linguistic
contexts (Barsalou andWiemer-Hastings, 2005; Zwaan, 2015). As
others have noted, the human embodied experience is actually
very rich and involves many internal processes (see Stapleton,
2011, 2013, for a thorough review and discussion), including
homeostatic and affective mechanisms (e.g., Ziemke and Lowe,
2009; Damasio, 2010) which may directly ground concepts
that are considered abstract. As noted by Stapleton (2013), the
internal body may2 matter to cognition. Of the aspects that
comprise this internal body, affect and emotion have received
the most attention in discussions of concept grounding so far.
Glenberg and Gallese (2012), for instance, propose an account
of language acquisition that includes emotional systems as a
providing means for grounding in addition to perception and
action. Similarly, Kousta et al. (2011) argue that abstract words
tend to be more emotionally valenced than concrete ones, and
that emotional content might be an important factor in the
representation and processing of abstract words in particular.
Newcombe et al. (2012) showed a correspondence between
emotional experience and speed (and accuracy) of classification
of abstract—but not concrete—words, and argue that abstract
concepts may be grounded in emotional features that remain
stable across different contexts (see also Siakaluk et al., 2014,
for a follow-up). The concept of “beautiful,” although having no
consistent external sensorimotor experience, may thus relate to
direct internal experience.
Research into concept grounding tends to focus on adult
language and cognition. There are, however, good reasons to
approach the topic from a developmental perspective (Kontra
et al., 2012). Most immediately, any mechanistic account of
concept grounding makes the direct prediction that whatever
mechanism is proposed has developed by the time that humans
use that concept—recall, for example, Dove’s (2011) concern
regarding the use of metaphors previously mentioned. Second,
bodily and cognitive development may be a crucial component
for explanatory accounts of cognitive mechanisms: after all,
humans acquire concepts during a period of dramatic change.
Concept grounding depends, by definition, on the
sensorimotor experience that is meant to provide this grounding.
The importance of this embodied input has been accepted since
Piaget’s classic work on the sensorimotor roots of cognitive
development (Piaget, 1952). More recently, however, new
technology has provided striking novel insights into the
infant’s embodied experience: that is, what infants experience is
substantially different from what adults experience. As the body
changes—e.g., arms grow longer, walking commences—so too
do important characteristics of the body-mediated information
available for concept grounding. Studies using head-mounted
2Stapleton (2013) actually omits the “may,” stating that “I argue that recent work in
neuroscience and robotics suggests cognitive systems are not merely superficially
embodied in the sense that the sensorimotor interactions with the environment are
the only interactions relevant to cognitive behavior, but that cognitive systems are
‘properly embodied’; the internal body matters to cognition” (pp. 1–2).
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eye trackers demonstrate, for example, that the content of the
infant’s visual field is qualitatively and quantitatively different
from that of the adult, because infants’ shorter arms lead them
to hold objects close to their faces (Smith et al., 2011). The
precise nature of the body (e.g., walking vs. crawling, height)
is clearly crucial in shaping this experience (Kretch et al.,
2014); yet it is also often ignored in the embodied cognitive
science literature. For instance, Ziemke (2003) points out that
“many discussions/notions of embodied cognition actually
pay relatively little attention to the nature and the role of
the body involved (if at all)” (p. 1306, emphasis in text) and
Borghi et al. (2013) similarly argues that “many versions of the
[embodied-grounded] view are too brainbound” (p. 2).
The developmental psychology literature also features a
substantial body of work concerned with human concept
and word acquisition. This work is highly relevant to the
concept grounding discussion. In particular, it illustrates how
change over time in the conceptual system reflects change
over time in the physical system. For instance, conceptual
structure changes radically across development (Quinn and
Eimas, 1997; Mandler, 2000): infants as young as 3 months form
perceptually-based categories (Quinn et al., 1993), but begin to
show evidence of more abstract representations by around 12
months (Mandler and Bauer, 1988), and make conceptually-
based category judgements by 4 years (Keil, 1989). Importantly,
early perceptual/conceptual structure and language acquisition
are intimately linked. For example, by drawing attention to
invariant, category-relevant features, perceptual variability in the
objects children see supports category formation and subsequent
word learning (e.g., Vlach et al., 2008; Twomey et al., 2014;
Goldenberg and Johnson, 2015). Relatedly, English-learning
children generalize category labels to new same-shape items, but
only if those items are solid rather than non-solid (Samuelson
andHorst, 2007). Further, variation in the physical position of the
body can disrupt word learning (Samuelson et al., 2011; Morse
et al., 2015). Thus, evidence from multiple modalities indicates
that the perceptually grounded nature of early concrete concepts
interacts with children’s ability to learn words. Indeed, the
interaction between perceptual grounding and early language has
been investigated. For example, in a word naming study which
included school-age children, Wellsby and Pexman (2014b)
demonstrated that the extent to which the referents of words
are easy to physically interact with (as rated by adults) affected
8- to 9-year old children’s written word processing. Specifically,
children’s naming latencies were shorter for words with high
body-object-interaction (BOI) ratings. The authors argued that
high-BOI words have richer semantic representations than low-
BOI words, leading to greater activation in the semantic system,
which in turn facilitates word recognition. Taken together with
the adult literature, the developmental embodied cognition
approach makes the prediction that the sensorimotor experience
associated with a concept should affect how easy it is to acquire
that concept.
Recent psycholinguistic studies have focused on the age of
acquisition (AoA) of words as a marker of concept learning, and
demonstrate that the semantic features of concepts themselves
affect the age at which their labels are learned. For example,
McDonough et al. (2011) examined the effect of a word’s
imageability (the extent to which a word generates a mental
image, Paivio et al., 1968) and class (e.g., noun, verb) on AoA.
As well as predicting AoA, imageability accounted for variation
that word class did not, indicating an independent role of
perceptual features in the acquisition of early abstract concepts
(for crosslinguistic evidence, see Ma et al., 2009). Closely related
to imageability is concreteness, or the extent to which a concept is
perceptible (Brysbaert et al., 2014). Bird et al. (2001) showed that
imageability and concreteness predicted AoA for children’s early-
produced nouns (see also Barca et al., 2002; Smolík, 2014). In a
study in which Dutch adults rated words for emotional valence,
arousal, power and AoA, valence was negatively correlated with
AoA such that more positive words were acquired earlier (Moors
et al., 2013). In addition, linguistic phenomena also affect AoA,
including—but not limited to—iconicity (Perry et al., 2015), and
in particular, input frequency (Naigles and Hoff-Ginsberg, 1998;
Barca et al., 2002; Storkel, 2004; Goodman et al., 2008; Ambridge
et al., 2015; Roy et al., 2015). Whether sensorimotor experience
predicts AoA, however, remains to be tested.
In the following section we bring together in a single analysis
variables that have been shown to affect AoA, specifically,
frequency, imageability and valence. Our goal is not to provide
an exhaustive account of conceptual and linguistic influences
on AoA; indeed, for many of these variables insufficient data
are available for a reliable analysis. However, to our knowledge
this is the first study to bring together these variables in
analysing the reliable measure of AoA provided by the widely-
used MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory
vocabulary norms (Fenson et al., 1993). We demonstrate that,
when taken together, these variables explain only a minority
of the variance, highlighting the importance of identifying and
testing new factors. In a second analysis we test our hypothesis
that sensorimotor grounding is important to AoA, by adding a
measure of body-object interaction. We argue that while existing
measures take into account conceptual and linguistic effects on
AoA, embodied characteristics of concepts may be an important
missing piece of the puzzle.
2. METHODS
To explore the effect of conceptual features on AoA we obtained
AoA, frequency, imageability and valence ratings from a range
of open access sources. Data used in the analyses are provided
in Supplementary Materials and Pearson correlations between
variables are presented in Table 1.
2.1. Age of Acquisition
Our goal was to explore the extent to which previously identified
variables predict the AoA of words commonly learned by human
infants. We took our target words from the MacArthur Bates
Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI; Fenson et al.,
1993). The MCDI is a well-established, normed and validated
list of 680 words that infants and toddlers learn to understand
and produce up to 30 months of age, and is widely used in
developmental research. We defined AoA as the month in which
50% or more of 1142 infants in the MCDI sample produced a
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 402
Thill and Twomey A Grounded Account of Concept Acquisition and Development
TABLE 1 | Pearson correlations between regression predictors.
BOI Imageability Frequency
Imageability 0.44***
Frequency 0.18 −0.45***
Valence −0.21* 0.23*** 0.22***
*p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
given word. AoA in months ranged from 12 (e.g., mommy) to
30+ (e.g., pretend). AoAs listed as 30+months were coded as 31
months for the purposes of the current analysis.
2.2. Frequency
Children’s language environment has been repeatedly shown to
influence their language acquisition (for a review, see Ambridge
et al., 2015). We therefore generated our frequency data from
real child-directed input, which is representative of the language
children hear, rather than relying on corpora of non-child-
directed spoken or written speech. CHILDES (MacWhinney,
2000) is a large, open-access online database of transcribed,
naturalistic conversations between adults and children. We
searched all Northern American corpora for each word in the
MCDI, with the exception of some sound effects and routines
(e.g., woof, patty cake). Only mothers’ utterances were queried,
providing an index of children’s input. This resulted in frequency
ratings for 638 words with frequencies ranging from 0 (cat) to
128124 (you) tokens (M = 2848.82).
2.3. Imageability and Concreteness
For each MCDI word for which we obtained frequency data we
extracted imageability and concreteness ratings from the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981; Wilson, 1988). The
database is a large, open-access collection of 26 psycholinguistic
variables for up to 150,000 words (although not all words have
data for all variables) aggregated from existing studies3. Because
imageability and concreteness were very highly correlated (r =
0.91, p < 0.0001), in line with Ma et al. (2009) and McDonough
et al. (2011), we used imageability as a predictor variable in the
following analyses. Imageability scores ranged from 195 (low) to
667 (high;M = 495.58).
2.4. Valence
Valence ratings for each word were taken from the 2010 version
of the Affective Norms for English Words dataset (ANEW;
Bradley and Lang, 2010). This version of ANEW consists of adult
ratings of 2476 words for pleasure (i.e., valence), arousal and
dominance. Scores ranged from 1.61 (happy) to 8.72 (unhappy;
M = 5.92).
2.5. Body-object Interaction
To explore our hypothesis that sensorimotor grounding may be
important for concept acquisition, we took measures of body-
object interaction (BOI) from Tillotson et al. (2008) and Bennett
et al. (2011), in which adults were asked to rate the extent to
which they could easily interact with a named item. Scores ranged
3Details available at http://www.psych.rl.ac.uk/MRC_Psych_Db_files/mrc2.html.
from 1.27 (first; low interactivity) to 6.43 (doll; high interactivity;
M = 4.68). Specifically, our assumption is that the experience
of interacting with concepts that rate highly is more multi-
modal than that of interacting with low-ranking concepts (if
such an experience exists at all), so BOI might serve as a proxy
to rank concepts by how much they are defined by an external
sensorimotor experience.
3. RESULTS
3.1. The Effect of Conceptual Features on
AoA
To explore the effect of conceptual features on AoA, we first
created a conceptual features model. AoA for the 398 words
with ratings for every variable was submitted to a linear
regression with frequency (log transformed), imageability (mean
centred) and valence (mean centred) as fixed effects. Because
high frequency function words have little or no semantic
content, while rarer nouns have rich semantics, we anticipated
that frequency and imageability would interact, so included a
frequency-by-imageability interaction term (cf. Roy et al., 2015).
Results are presented inTable 2. The principal result is that the
interaction between frequency and imageability predicts AoA,
extending the findings of McDonough et al. (2011) and Ma
et al. (2009), who each found correlations between CDI AoA
and imageability ratings. As illustrated in Figure 1, although late-
acquired words tend to be lower frequency, function words (e.g.,
an, the, to) have low imageability and are acquired late despite
being high frequency. In contrast, high-imageability words for
the things infants encounter in their everyday environment (e.g.,
puppy) are acquired early despite occurring infrequently. In
addition to the interaction between imageability and frequency,
main effects of these two variables confirmed that as imageability
increased, AoA decreased (see also Ma et al., 2009; McDonough
et al., 2011), and in line with Roy et al. (2015), as frequency
increased, AoA decreased. Interestingly, in contrast with existing
studies (e.g., Bird et al., 2001; Moors et al., 2013), valence did not
predict AoA; however the adult ratings we used may not capture
the effect of a word’s valence on young children. More broadly,
the differences between our results and existing studies may
stem from some important methodological differences: while the
majority of work uses adult ratings of word AoA and frequency
measures taken from corpora of adult-directed language, we
use parental measures of their own children’s language and
frequencies taken from child-directed speech (cf. McDonough
et al., 2011). This contrast highlights the need for child-centric
ratings of such predictors, and illustrates the importance of
taking seriously the real input to infants when investigating
developmental phenomena (Smith et al., 2011).
The goal of this analysis was to illustrate that even well-tested
predictors are unable to fully explain AoA. As expected, this
model accounted for less than half of the variance (adjusted R2 =
0.38), leaving substantial scope for the influence of other factors
on early concept acquisition. As noted above, our analysis focuses
on variables which have repeatedly been shown to influence
AoA, and ignores those for which no data are available. Thus,
we do not claim that it is an exhaustive model of the factors
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TABLE 2 | Conceptual features model parameters and significance tests
(N = 239).
β t p F df p
Overall model 37.73 (4, 234) <0.0001***
Log frequency −1.48 −6.74 < 0.0001***
Imageability −0.022 −7.33 < 0.0001***
Valence 0.055 0.34 0.74
Log frequency ×
imageability
−0.0065 −3.18 0.0017**
R2 0.39
Adjusted R2 0.38
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | AoA of early concepts plotted by log frequency and
imageability. Darker text indicates later AOI.
affecting concept AoA. We do, however, argue that the variance
unaccounted for is not simply random variation, but rather the
result of linguistic and concept-internal variables not typically
included in analyses of AoA. In particular, this leaves open the
possibility that embodied aspects of concepts may contribute to
the ease with which they are acquired.
3.2. The Effect of a Sensorimotor
Grounding on AoA
To explore whether the extent of sensorimotor grounding might
play a role in concept acquisition (as discussed in Section 2.5), we
TABLE 3 | BOI model parameters and significance tests (N = 151).
β t p F df p
Overall model 21.32 (5, 145) < 0.001***
Log frequency −0.93 −1.78 0.078
Imageability −0.013 −2.22 0.028*
Valence −0.19 −0.76 0.45
Body-object
interaction
−0.88 −4.49 < 0.001***
Log frequency ×
imageability
−0.010 −1.99 0.049*
R2 0.42
Adjusted R2 0.40
*p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 4 | Conceptual features model parameters and significance tests
fit to dataset used for BOI model (N = 151).
β t p F df p
Overall model 19.11 (4, 146) < 0.001***
Log frequency −0.59 −1.07 0.28
Imageability −0.022 −3.59 < 0.001***
Valence 0.037 0.27 0.14
Log frequency ×
imageability
−0.014 −2.62 0.0099**
R2 0.39
Adjusted R2 0.38
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
added a measure of body-object interaction as a predictor in the
conceptual features model to create a BOI model. Because fewer
of our target words had ratings for this variable, the final dataset
for this analysis consisted of complete ratings for 151 words.
As illustrated in Table 3, when the additional BOI term is
included, the frequency-by-imageability interaction and main
effect of imageability predict AoA, while the main effect of
frequency does not. Critically, in line with our predictions, BOI
does predict AoA, such that as words are rated as more difficult
to interact with, AoA increases. Importantly, this model also
explained a greater proportion of the variance in AoA, with an
increase in adjusted R-squared from 0.38 to 0.40. To compare
the fit of our two models, we first refit the conceptual features
model to the smaller dataset; this resulted in a similar pattern
of results (see Table 4). Including the BOI term resulted in a
reduction in AIC from 788.43 to 770.80. Taken together with
the increase in adjusted R-squared, this confirms that the BOI
model fits the data better, explaining more variance than the
conceptual features model and supporting our claim that the
extent to which concepts are grounded in the body affects
AoA.
Although including BOI improved the fit of the model, it
nonetheless again left a majority of the variance unaccounted
for—as expected, given that it did not include linguistic effects
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on AoA, for example iconicity (Perry et al., 2015), ease of
pronunciation (Jorm, 1991) and contextual diversity (Hills et al.,
2009), and the fact that these ratings came from adults. Thus,
it is, for example, possible that using child ratings of BOI could
improve the model fit further. What drives concept AoA is far
from being fully understood; however the above analyses strongly
suggest that grounding in sensorimotor experience could be a
critical piece in this puzzle.
4. WHAT ARE CONCEPTS MADE OF?
To summarize the results, we first showed that semantic features
and linguistic phenomena such as frequency are not sufficient to
explain AoA data. Our main hypothesis is that this is because
such features do not take into account grounding in a rich or
proper sensorimotor experience. We then demonstrated that
including predictors related to such a grounding improve on the
initial results.
There is clearly much work to be done to validate the
hypothesis further. First and foremost, there are currently no
major corpora of data that relate to relevant measures other than
BOI as used above. Second, the measure of BOI used above
takes no account of interoceptive aspects of the sensorimotor
experience, which, as noted, are likely to play a part in conceptual
structure. How to tap into such interoceptive aspects is not trivial.
Although valence ratings may seem like a good starting point
(since valence itself is part of the internal sensory experience),
they do not provide a measure of how diverse (or multi-
modal) the internal sensory experience associated with a concept
is4. Instead, they quantify the strength of one aspect (which
is clearly relevant, as argued for instance by Kousta et al.,
2011, but not necessarily sufficient since there are other
internal modalities as discussed, for example, by Stapleton 2011).
Together with the limitations of BOI mentioned before, there is
therefore still a need for designing new types of measures that
address both internal and external sensorimotor experience more
explicitly.
The purpose of the remainder of this paper is therefore to
outline a mechanism of concept learning which explicitly takes
into account embodied features beyond simple sensorimotor
interaction (for instance, interoceptive features) whilst
incorporating the variables which have been repeatedly shown
to affect AoA, and by extension, conceptual development and
structure. In doing so, we will generate testable predictions for
future work and lay the groundwork for future research into
novel measures that can validate our hypothesis.
To provide this characterization, we cast our discussion
in terms of a cognitive architecture since these necessarily
formally specify the mechanisms underlying concept use.
Specifically, we base our discussion on the semantic pointer
architecture (SPA, see Eliasmith, 2013). It would of course
be equally possible to formulate these ideas in frameworks
other than SPA; the Neural Blackboard Architecture framework
(van der Velde and de Kamps, 2006), for example, is also
4In PAD space (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974), for example, valence ratings do not
relate to the A or the D.
concerned with the creation of combinatorial structures, such
as concepts, that might underlie human cognition. For the
present purposes, however, we think SPA well-suited: it is
inspired by human semantics and syntax in that its “semantic
pointers” can be interpreted as perceptually grounded symbols
in the sense of Barsalou (1999). SPA can also incorporate
mechanisms necessary for concept grounding in terms of a
rich sensorimotor experience (see Thill, 2015, for a longer
discussion).
The question of when children acquire concepts can therefore
be reformulated, for the present purposes, as asking at what
age the corresponding semantic pointer forms. In the following,
we first give a brief overview of the main computational
principles in SPA (we refer the interested reader to Eliasmith,
2013, for a much more thorough discussion, including various
demonstrations of cognitive and biological plausibility). We
then provide the aforementioned characterization of concepts,
which finally allows us to highlight directions for future
work.
4.1. Brief Overview of Semantic Pointers
Semantic pointers, in SPA, are vectors in a high-dimensional5.
space. For example, the concept of a robin would thus be
described by a vector robin. To specify how such a vector might
be obtained, SPA takes inspiration from hierarchical structures
in the human brain such as the visual cortex (Felleman and
Van Essen, 1991). For example, the retinal image of a robin
is successively compressed through the different layers of the
hierarchy for object recognition (V1 → V2 → V4 → IT) into
a representation with significantly lower dimensionality than the
original retinal input. This resulting representation at the top of
the hierarchy would be a semantic pointer robVis encoding the
visual appearance of a robin.
Multiple representations can then be bound together to form a
new concept. In SPA, the binding operator is circular convolution,
denoted by ⊛, a vector operation which takes two vectors as an
input and returns a vector of the same length as an output. To
give an example from Eliasmith (2013), one could construct a
semantic pointer for perceptual features of a robin:
robinPercept = visual⊛ robVis+ auditory⊛ robAud
+ tactile⊛ robTact+ . . .
where each element in bold represents a semantic pointer. robin
could then be defined as:
robin = perceptual⊛ robinPercept+ isA⊛ bird
+ indicates⊛ spring+ . . .
There are several aspects of semantic pointers that we do not
discuss here. It is, for example, possible to “read out” particular
components of a semantic pointer (such as what the visual
percept RobinVis within the overall concept of Robin is), and
to recall the visual image(s) used in forming that particular
pointer—a process that can be interpreted as a type of simulation
5Eliasmith (2013) suggests that 500 dimensions are sufficient for human cognition.
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of previous sensorimotor experience as proposed by Barsalou
(Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Barsalou,
2009). Further discussions of the underlying neural structures,
necessary neural mechanisms, and biological plausibility can be
found in Eliasmith (2013).
For the present purposes, it is also worth emphasizing that,
although it is capable of symbolic manipulation, SPA is not a
symbolic account of cognition; the semantic pointers related
to any concept are not arbitrary symbols but a compressed
combination of perceptual features that make up the concept. As
such, the sensorimotor experience of a given concept by an agent
plays a fundamental role in forming the concept and shaping
computations that use it.
4.2. Characterization of Richly Grounded
Concepts
In essence, we argue throughout this paper that sensorimotor
concept grounding requires a rich perspective of what the term
“sensorimotor” actually entails: it is not merely sufficient to
consider basic sensorimotor interaction with the external world;
internal percepts (including affect, emotional components and
other aspects of interoception as discussed in more detail, for
example, by Stapleton, 2011) are equally important (Thill et al.,
2014; Wellsby and Pexman, 2014a). We therefore postulate that
the sensory features of a concept, directly perceived at a given
time t, can be described as follows:
SDt =
∑
i
∑
j
Modalityexti ⊛ featurej
+
∑
k
∑
l
Modalityintk ⊛ featurel (1)
where we omit an explicit mention of time on the RHS. Equation
(1) simply captures the idea that concepts are multimodal and
made up of any number of features from any number of
modalities (notably, this number can also be low: constructs are
not necessarily complex. In particular, a concept could consist
of a single modality, for example the concept “yellow”). What
matters is the direct nature of these features; by which we mean
that they are not time-dependent. They could for instance relate
to a color or the shape of a solid object, as acquired by the visual
modality, the smoothness of a surface from a tactile modality,
or an affordance elicited by a given object. They could equally
relate to direct visceral feelings elicited when experiencing, for
example, surprise, pleasure, or to the proprioceptive feeling of an
extended arm. Affective mechanisms or emotional components
(as highlighted by many, e.g., Kousta et al., 2011; Glenberg and
Gallese, 2012; Newcombe et al., 2012) of concepts can be included
by representing the different dimensions as internal modalities.
For example, in PAD Space (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974), one
might posit the following: Pleasure ⊛ valuep + Arousal ⊛
valuea + Dominance ⊛ valued.
Other sensorimotor perceptions, on the other hand, are time-
dependent: movements are, for example, by definition expressed
over time. We sketch such percepts as:
ST = f
(
SDt=1,...,n
)
(2)
where the notation again chooses simplicity over being explicit
since it is merely meant to be a sketch of a process that would
capture temporal aspects of percepts. Here, f (·) is therefore a
simply placeholder for a temporal function (see, for example,
Pack and Bensmaia, 2015, for a discussion of neural sensitivity
to temporal stimuli, and underlying computations, in both the
visual and touch modalities).
We argue that Equations (1 and 2) provide a reasonable
characterization of the sensorimotor experience that may ground
concepts and provides a starting point for analysing concept
acquisition. To address word acquisition proper, we also need
to recognize that verbal labels can be attached to concepts. This
gives us the first expression for a concept grounded in rich
sensorimotor experience:
C = SD + ST + Label⊛ name (3)
Next, we note that pointers in SPA can be constructed from
other pointers, as in the previous example of the robin. We can
introduce a similar idea here by noting that a given concept can
be made up by more than just direct sensory features; it can
equally include existing concepts:
C = SD + ST +
∑
i
∑
j
Includesi ⊛ Cj + Label⊛ name (4)
where we highlight that other concepts are not merely added
by summation (see Eliasmith, 2013); it is rather the compressed
vector that is added as a property (that we refer to as
Includes here). Equation (4) also captures how some researchers,
(particularly those primarily interested in robotic models of
concept grounding) believe abstract concepts can be grounded
(see Stramandinoli et al., 2012, for an example and Thill et al.
2014, for a larger discussion). In such theories, rather than being
grounded in direct sensorimotor features, abstract (or higher
order) concepts are instead grounded in other concepts, possibly
with no direct sensorimotor component at all, meaning the first
two terms on the RHS of Equation (4) would be empty.
In sum, we argue that Equation (4) describes the general
form of a grounded concept, can accommodate current views
on concepts, can account for abstract concept acquisition, and
allows us to incorporate a rich embodied experience without
positing a separate mechanism. For example, the modalities
that provide features can extend to the social domain, in line
with claims that more abstract words go beyond the simple
sensorimotor to include a stronger social component (Borghi
and Cimatti, 2009, 2012; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014). It is also
worth highlighting that the characterization does not require
all components to be related to some form of sensorimotor
experience (even if rich). The use of Includes allows for the
inclusion of purely linguistic features (Kousta et al., 2011),
which in turn allows for dis-embodied concepts in the sense
of Dove (2011). Indeed, in any of the above, the left-hand
term of the ⊛ operator in SPA could in principle refer to
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anything and does not necessarily need to be itself something
that has a direct sensorimotor grounding (as is clear from
the robin example above). This therefore also allows for the
construction of metaphors in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson
(1980)—as a crude example, one could for instance postulate the
following:
Happiness ≈ Modalityint ⊛ Up (5)
which is meant to express that happiness causes interoceptive
feelings that are somewhat akin to the grounded concept of “Up.”
Up, here is a concept as described by Equation (4).
Finally, it is worth pointing out that this characterization
is open to the use of purely amodal symbols, perhaps even in
conjunction with grounded ones. Exploring this further would
require a theory of how such semantic pointers are formed,
but once they are, they could be used at the appropriate places
in Equations (1–4) (where one could for instance imagine a
dedicated modality for amodal symbols). We do not pursue this
here since our main aim is to discuss the grounding of concepts.
5. DISCUSSION
Having characterized concepts in terms of the semantic pointer
architecture, we now turn to ways in which it can contribute
to our understanding of concept acquisition. The first thing
to note is that this new account is strongly developmental. As
mentioned in the introduction, concepts evolve over time—
a 5 year old’s concept of love is unlikely to be identical to
that of a 15-year-old, which in turn is likely to be different
from the concept the individual will have at age 35. For any
given concept, its characterization in Equation (4) therefore
changes over time. In particular, concepts may initially be
formed from partial information and additional terms added
as the modalities that provide such features develop, or other
types of information becomes available, reflecting the rapid
development of conceptual structures seen in early childhood
(Quinn and Eimas, 1997; Mandler, 2000). The characterization
given by Equation (4), for any given concept, is therefore
also subject to development. Thus, it is possible to predict
a developmental timeline given a hypothesis of necessary
constitutents—that is, a concept can only be acquired once
its constituent semantic pointers have been acquired. It is
worth pointing out that any theory of concept acquisition
implicitly makes at least one prediction in this sense: that
the proposed cognitive mechanisms exist by the time children
begin to acquire the concepts in question. As noted previously
for example, Dove (2011) has argued that the ability to form
metaphors develops too late to adequately be positioned at
the core of abstract concept grounding (although metaphors
can contribute to such concepts once available). Similarly,
the idea that concepts might be made of contextualized
simulations (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings,
2005; Barsalou, 2009) predicts that the necessary mechanisms
to develop such simulations develops in a manner consistent
with AoA. Conversely, if a developmental timeline for simulation
mechanisms is given6, it is then possible to sketch how a concept
develops from AoA onwards as the simulations it relies on
mature.
A historic problem for theories of embodied cognition is how
to account for acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts in
a single mechanism. For example, while concrete yellow can be
directly acquired from the external world, the more abstract
lonely requires interoceptive features, while whatever is arguably
linguistically mediated. Here, Equation (4) provides a starting
point since it can form the basis for a measure of how much
of a given concept is grounded in simple, directly perceivable
sensorimotor modalities in the sense of Equations (1 and 2). In
other words, how abstract a concept is is a function of how much
of its substance goes beyond simple sensorimotor grounding.
This is essentially very similar to the previously mentioned claims
from theWAT theory (Borghi and Binkofski, 2014), which argues
that more abstract concepts are made up of more social aspects
that are not related to an individual’s sensorimotor experience.
At the same time it extends this to include any source for aspects
that are not of a simple external sensorimotor type, including
not only more complex sensorimotor experiences related to
linguistic usage of the concepts (Barsalou et al., 2008; Dove,
2011; Zwaan, 2015) but also interoceptive (Thill et al., 2014)
features.
Because our characterization in Equation (4) incorporates
interoceptive features, the conceptual structure it entails is subtly
different from that of the commonly and often interchangeably
used, adult-rated concreteness or imageability scales (Reilly and
Dean, 2007). By trying to provide a way to quantify how much
of a concept is grounded in a rich but direct sensorimotor
experience, we measure the “groundability” of a concept: the
degree to which a concept is directly grounded in embodied
processes. Importantly, these embodied processes include
internal modalities, including affect and other interoceptive
aspects: a concept can thus be directly grounded even if it
has no perceivable aspect in the external world. Rather than
distinguishing between “concrete” and “abstract” concepts, then,
we distinguish between concepts that have a larger or smaller
proportion of directly grounded components. Developing a
groundability scale, in particular one that can account for
development, will be key to empirical tests of this account.
The mechanisms provided by SPA also raise important
questions for subsequent work: for example, since SPA uses
vectors for the underlying representations, what might the
distribution of these vectors be when constructed in a bio-
realistic fashion, and to what degree does this relate directly
to our measure of groundability? Further, a developmental
process that enriches concepts over time with newly accessible
information from existing or new modalities effectively modifies
the direction of the vector in space. This might provide
a quantitative measure for the amount of change that the
6Thill and Svensson (2011) discuss the current lack of such a timeline in more
detail and speculate that simulations may co-develop with dreams, with the
implication being that the quality of dreams (which do not reach adult-levels of
sophistication until the late teens) may serve as an indicator of the sophistication
of internal models underlying simulations.
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introduction of a new cognitive mechanism can induce in a
concept.
Importantly, this approach is also consistent with the
developmental literature. Sloutsky (2010), for example, provides
such an account of the neural mechanisms underlying concept
learning, distinguishing between statistically “dense” and “sparse”
categories (the difference being the amount of redundant
information that a concept carries). Sloutsky relates these
to different learning mechanisms—compression mechanisms
for dense, and selection mechansisms for sparse categories.
Where abstract concepts (which, in his terms are concepts
that have no sensory target, such as “love”) are concerned,
Sloutsky posits an important role for the executive function,
and therefore PFC. Taken together, these insights combine
into a developmental hypothesis of category learning: dense
categories are easier to learn than sparse because the required
compression mechanisms develop earlier while the involvement
of the executive function in abstract concepts would predict
a late acquisition due to the late maturation of the PFC (for
a much more detailed reasoning, see Sloutsky, 2010). The
account we have provided here includes these considerations
in the precise neural mechanisms that SPA postulates to
underlie semantic pointer formation (Eliasmith, 2013), but it
also extends them with a more explicit inclusion of embodied
mechanisms that have their own developmental timeline.
Our account also ties in with Barsalou’s idea of situated
conceptualization (Barsalou, 2009) and the suggestion that
concepts are a “large collection of situational representations”
(Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005, p. 156) since, as
previously noted, SPA can be seen as a computational
implementation of Barsalou’s (1999) perceptual symbol system. A
situated conceptualization could be achieved by decompressing
some of the semantic pointers (thus activating simulations
of the corresponding sensorimotor experience) that make
up a given concept. Conversely a theory of what situated
conceptualizations for a given concept need to contain can in
turn provide insights into what aspects of (internal and external)
sensorimotor experience might make up that concept, thus
contributing to insights into the nature of Equation (4) for that
concept.
6. CONCLUSION
In sum, we have shown how developmental accounts of concept
acquisition can include embodied theories of cognition, without
being forced to claim that all aspects of all concepts are
necessarily grounded in some sensorimotor experience. We
have also highlighted the importance of understanding the
term “sensorimotor” experience as going beyond sensorimotor
interaction with the external world: the inside matters just as
much. We refer to the extent to which a concept is richly
embodied in this way as its groundability. Using empirical
data, we have shown both that the semantic features typically
considered in developmental studies are not sufficient to explain
variability in AoA and, critically, that including BOI as a measure
which can be related to sensorimotor experience improves the
results.
Our account unifies existing theories of embodied cognition in
a single mechanism by highlighting how cognitive mechanisms
that develop comparatively late can enrich existing concepts. It
also makes it clear that concepts which have no components
that are available early on can only develop later. It also suggests
that additional factors in AoA cover a range of attributes: (a)
the complexity of the underlying concepts in terms of how
many modalities and features they aggregate, (b) the proportion
of directly groundable features, (c) the degree to which such
features refer to aspects of the external sensorimotor experience,
(d) the development of necessary sophisticated mechanisms,
and (e) the ability to communicate about them. Thus, this
theoretical account integrates research in embodied cognition
and cognitive development, paving, we hope, the way for future
empirical tests of the interaction between groundability and
concept acquisition.
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